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Abstract
A major part of the commercial Internet is moving toward the cloud paradigm. This phenomenon has a drastic impact on
the organizational structures of enterprizes and introduces new challenges that must be properly addressed to avoid major
setbacks. One such challenge is that of cloud provider viability, that is, the reasonable certainty that the Cloud Service
Provider (CSP) will not go out of business, either by filing for bankruptcy or by simply shutting down operations, thus
leaving its customers stranded without an infrastructure and, depending on the type of cloud service used, even without
their applications or data. This article attempts to address the issue of cloud provider viability, defining a possible way of
modeling viability as a non-functional requirement and proposing some approaches that can be used to mitigate the problem,
both from a technical and from a legal perspective. By introducing a structured perspective into the topic of cloud viability,
describing the risks, factors and possible mitigators, the contribution of this work is twofold: it gives the customer a better
understanding to determine when it can rely on the cloud infrastructure on the long term and what precautions it should take
in any case, and provides the CSP with means to address some of the viability issues and thus increase its customers’ trust.
Keywords Cloud · Viability · Standardization · Service Level Agreement (SLA) · Software escrow
JEL Classiﬁcation G3 · K
Introduction
In November 2013, an alarm rang. Nirvanix, a major
provider of cloud storage services operating in California,
suddenly closed down its business. Nirvanix was one
of the major stakeholders in cloud storage services, and
customers had to recur to insourcing or migrate to other
cloud providers. However, customers were notified only two
weeks before the final shutdown (Butler 2014). Hosting
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terabytes of data on Nirvanix services, they had to deal with
a considerable interruption time that entailed a halt of their
running services. The impact of this incident on some major
enterprizes, including IBM (who used Nirvanix’s cloud
storage technology) and Dell (who had some agreements
with Nirvanix) has not been disclosed. The sudden event
wroke havoc in the cloud community, and revealed a
significant weakness of the cloud-based business model:
once an enterprize outsources services and data to a cloud
provider, it is no longer in control of them, and can suffer
from adverse conditions occurring to the cloud provider.
Nirvanix was not an isolated case, as several Cloud Service
Provider (CSP) incidents have been reported over the last years.
In 2012, Megaupload, one of the pioneering companies in pro-
viding storage services, has been shut down by the US
Department of Justice which started an investigation against
its employees (Anthony 2012), and its founder Kim Dotcom
created a new storage service known as MegaCloud. In late
2013, this service disappeared as well (McKendrick 2013),
possibly due to an NSA blockade. Users have suddenly lost
access to the areas where they had stored the files.
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The case of the 2e2 company highlights other interesting
consequences. After 2e2 went bankrupt, it first asked its
customers (such as Vodafone and Kellog) a large amount of
funding to keep the service up and running (Venkatraman
2013). Shortly after, it was discovered that the company
had outsourced most of its customers’ data to third-
party services. After the bankruptcy, the data centers were
acquired by a company that guaranteed that it would keep
providing the service to customers.
While the outsourcing of services to the cloud is
definitely the business model toward which the market is
heading, it introduces new and significant challenges. Some
of them are simply a new way of addressing well-known
issues, such as performance issues, resource availability,
service security and reliability, but others are strictly related
to the outsourcing of parts of the business to the CSP.
Outsourcing assets to a CSP is a critical decision that
requires a careful weighing of its costs and benefits (Haile
and Altmann 2013).
The risk of the CSP suddenly going out of business,
either through a “soft” cessation (i.e., filing for bankruptcy),
or in a more abrupt way (simply ceasing the operations
and removing the assets) concerns the uncertainty about
the stability of the CSP. If the CSP faces a bad financial
situation, it might decide to go out of business, and this
could happen more or less abruptly. For example, the
CSP might file for bankruptcy, leaving its customers to
entertain their business with the trustee instead of the regular
CSP management board. Even worse, the CSP might not
go through the legal shutdown, and instead simply cease
to do business, shutting down all operations and leaving
its customers stranded and unable to use their required
infrastructure anymore. And all this might occur without
any forewarning to the CSP’s customers.
This is the problem of the so-called long-term viability
of CSPs, one of the main factors to take into account when
moving to a cloud platform. Normally, the migration to a
cloud is a one-way door. Unless there is a major change
in the size of the enterprize’s business (in which case there
might be pressing needs to adopt an in-house architecture),
the choice to rely on a CSP to run its business, both as a
starting choice or after migrating pre-existing applications,
is a long-term one. The relationship between the client
enterprize and the CSP is likely to last until either one goes
out of business. But there is a lot of difference between the
client enterprize and the CSP going out of business. In the
former case, the CSP would lose a customer, which might
have serious repercussions from an economic point of view,
but this fact does not per se hinder the CSP’s operations.
On the other side, the CSP going out of business would
seriously hamper the client’s operations, regardless of the
client’s business status. Even if the enterprize’s activity were
solid and growing, the CSP’s end of business could block
all of its IT activities, because the underlying infrastructure
would not be accessible anymore. Of course, the customer
can always switch to another CSP or set up an in-house
architecture, but this in turn raises new problems concerning
time and money.
This paper addresses the issue of CSP long-term viability.
Due to the novelty of the topic, there is no analysis of
viability from a requirements engineering point of view. To
address the problem, it is necessary to formalize it, also
providing metrics for risk assessment. The purpose of this
work is to evaluate what solutions (mostly not specifically
designed for viability) the CSP and the client can adopt
to avoid the consequences of the CSP suddenly going
out of business, and what further problems emerge from
these solutions. We discuss the issue from two perspectives,
namely an IT and a legal point of view, and propose a list of
technical and legal measures to mitigate the problem.
In particular, this paper mainly aims at addressing the
following questions.
RQ1 What is long-term viability and what effects does it
have on enterprizes?
RQ2 What is a possible formal model to express long-
term viability?
RQ3 What are the possible means to increase the long-
term viability of a CSP?
To answer the first question, an analysis of the (few)
sources dealing with the issue of long-term viability will
help define the risks and consequences, also on the basis of
the nature of the CSP, and separate it from the related, and
more popular, topic of reliability. The answer to the second
question will leverage on Requirements Engineering (RE)
techniques and tools to model long-term viability and find
suitable metrics for it. Concerning the third question, the
answer lies in an analysis of solutions already adopted by
the industry or introduced in literature, with a proposal to
classify them and evaluate their potential benefits.
Conversely, a question that this paper does not address
is the one concerning the convenience, for a CSP, to enact
some of the proposed solutions on the basis of economic
factors. This work is focused on legal and technical
implications of the proposed solutions, and a detailed cost
analysis entail a different approach, as it is extremely
complex to assess many of the factors that affect the benefits
and costs of implementing them. Without delving into an
in-depth quantitative analysis (which will be considered as
a future work), the paper only proposes a coarse-grained
evaluation of the proposed approaches, in particular by
classifying them depending on the type and size of the
CSP. Such an assessment can already provide some useful
insights that could be used as a starting point for a more
detailed analysis.
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The problems and solutions presented here, to some
extent, can be applied to service providers in general.
However, this paper mainly focuses on the cloud for two
main reasons. On one hand, the concept of cloud is quite
wide and tends to embrace many different types of service
providers. For example, the SaaS paradigm represents
the business perspective of Service Oriented Architecture
(SOA). On the other hand, outsourcing assets to the cloud
has a more significant impact on the IT infrastructure than
relying on external service providers for minor activities
such as hosting or content delivery.
This work is structured as follows. “Problem statement”
delves into the concept of cloud computing and illustrates
the problem with respect to the various types of cloud.
“Related work” is a survey of literature on cloud viabil-
ity and some approaches that could partially address the
problem. “A mathematical model of viability” proposes a
mathematical model of viability, to assess the seriousness
of the problem and evaluate the improvements that can be
achieved by means of specific mitigators. “Addressing the
problem” tries to build on existing research to propose solu-
tions or mitigators based on technical (“Discussion of possi-
ble IT solutions”) or legal (Legal perspective and solutions)
approaches, or even mixed solutions (Mixed approaches).
The, “Considerations on the proposed solutions” summa-
rizes the proposed solutions, together with a high-level
estimate of their potential costs and benefits, and describes a
real-life scenario that is recurrent in Luxembourg as a Euro-
pean financial center. A cloud provider is hosting a Web
Banking application that represents the main IT service of
a large Bank in Luxembourg, with an interface to perform
financial transactions for many customers. The techniques
used by the CSP that might affect long-term viability are
shown. Finally, “Conclusions” tries to wrap up the outcomes
of the paper.
Problem statement
The current paper focuses particularly on the problem of
service providers offering cloud services. The differenti-
ating criteria between a CSP and other types of services
depend upon the definition. Referring to the definition
used by the Luxembourgish Commission de Surveillance
du Secteur Financier (CSSF) (Surveillance du Secteur
Financier (CSSF) 2017), a number of criteria are defined
for a service provider, and if not all of them are met, the
provider cannot be qualified as a CSP. The definition relies
on several features to define the activity of a cloud provider,
such as on-demand self-service, broad network access,
resources pooling, rapid elasticity and measured service.
The outsourcing of services is subject to several security
practices that enable to protect the customers’ hosted data.
However, the model and solutions presented herein could
be adapted to other service providers that do not fit into the
definition of CSP.
Depending on the amount of the assets that have been
outsourced, the effect of the CSP going out of business
can be much different (Caplan 2010). When dealing with
IaaS or PaaS CSPs, the main assets (application source code
and data) are under the control of the customer, who can
migrate them (with different technical difficulties between
IaaS and PaaS); in a SaaS environment, on the other hand,
the customer normally has no access to the application
source code or the datacentre where its data are stored, plus
it might also lack the technical skills to perform a migration.
In particular, with respect to the most common types of
cloud models:
– the loss of IaaS platforms1 would require the client to
find or set up a suitable hardware architecture;
– PaaS clouds would require it to also set up the basic
software platform for running its applications. This con-
figuration is very common for those enterprizes which
offer web-based services to their end customers. In
general, the customers of PaaS clouds2 are application
developers who offer their applications through the cloud;
– finally, in the SaaS paradigm, the client (the end user
of the IT service) normally only uses a web browser
(thin client) to access the service, so a CSP going
out of business completely cuts its clients off their IT
applications and data.
The problem might depend not only on the CSP but also
on other third-party partners going out of business in case
the CSP has in turn outsourced some of its services (Caplan
2010), with a potential cascading effect. Additionally, the
size of the problem depends on the degree of interoperability
and standardization adopted by the CSP (Gebregiorgis and
Altmann 2015; Jeffery et al. 2015).
Long-term viability is one of the major risks that must
be taken into account when choosing to rely on a CSP to
support one’s software applications. The money that can be
saved by relying on an external infrastructure (Koch et al.
2012) might be counterweighted by the risk of having the
business stalled for some time, or the software and data lost
due to the shutdown of the CSP.
The risks related to long-term viability change with the
size of the CSP. Relying on major CSPs, such as a large
provider with an insignificant risk of abruptly shutting
down, mitigates the problem. But the type of service
offered by these CSPs might not be suited for the needs
1The reference example is Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2)
(http://aws.amazon.com/ec2/).
2Such as Google App Engine (https://appengine.google.com/start) or the
Salesforce1 platform (http://www.salesforce.com/platform/connect-
integrate/).
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of the would-be customer. Additionally, while the potential
customer enterprize might enjoy some negotiating power
against smaller CSPs, so as to adjust the cloud functionality
to its own needs, no such power will be available against
major corporations, leaving the enterprize the sole options
to accept or reject the standard offer. The enterprize might
have political reasons to prefer a small CSP over a large one
(for example nationality); the reasons might be economic
(favorable offers by the small CSP); or the choice might
be pushed by the need for interoperability with partners
relying on a specific cloud. However, small, start-up cloud
providers are more subject to market fluctuations, and might
at some time decide to stop providing hosting services to
their customers, or to move to another business model.
The negative impact that the bankruptcy of a CSP can
have on its customers can vary greatly, depending on the
delivery model of CSP (IaaS, PaaS or SaaS), on the nature
and amount of the assets outsourced, and on the technical
infrastructure. Without carrying out a detailed analysis of all
the possible combinations, it is possible to identify some of
the main threats.
– The most likely issue is the loss of the outsourced
assets, which might be data (especially in the less-
pervasive delivery model SaaS) or the technical means
required to offer one’s services. Lost assets require the
customer to rebuild them, which can entail a major
investment of time and money, or face the consequences
of the loss, which might lead to legal remedies to refund
of potential damages.
– Even if the assets are not lost, recovering them
might take a significant amount of time through the
bankruptcy estate, and this in turn might lead to
significant losses in the interim.
– In addition to the assets problem, the customer might
face some difficulty in finding or setting up a suitable
alternative to restart running its operations.
– All of the above situations entail a significant cost
in terms of planning, time and money, in addition to
the possible loss of revenues and reputation due to
prolonged inactivity, and the customer, especially a
small one with limited financial resources, might be
unable to face such costs. Therefore the CSP going out
of business has the potential of dragging its customers
into a similar fate.
Over the last years. cloud providers’ viability has
exposed some criticalities of the cloud-based business
model. According to Gartner, one of the major risks posed
by cloud adoption is the uncertainty related to providers
viability, and one out of four cloud providers were deemed
eligible to go out of business in 2015 due to some reasons
such as bankruptcy or acquisition (Thibodeau 2013).
Long-term viability is in the interest both of the client
enterprize and the CSP: the former has an interest that the
cloud infrastructure will be available and able to guarantee
its service, whereas the CSP wants to be seen as a reliable
entity which enterprizes can rely upon, so both parties might
be willing to undertake some measures against the risk of
a sudden disappearance of the CSP (bankruptcy, acquisition
by third parties and subsequent termination, forced closure
by public authorities and so on).
Related work
While the need that a software service is available
and functioning for long periods of time is certainly
a fundamental requirement, there is little consensus
in literature concerning its classification. Most sources
(Hennesy 1999; Avizienis et al. 2004; Glinz 2007; Lee
et al. 2009) classify it either as reliability (Roman 1985) or
availability (ISO 2011). Other sources (Laprie and Kanoun
1996) define availability as the readiness for usage, and
reliability as the continuity of service, and both are a subset
of dependability.3 In general, however, this requirement is
treated in the perspective of a continuity of business. In
other words, it is a requirement that measures the amount of
transient situations that prevent the usage of a service.
Some clear overlapping exists between the topics of
reliability and long-term viability. The former is seen as
a major concern (Hu et al. 2011), and several models,
metrics and solutions have been proposed (Bauer and
Adams 2012; Franke et al. 2014). In particular, (Glinz
2005) proposes an approach which distinguishes between
those requirements that can be assessed with quantitative,
qualitative or descriptive metrics. van Moorsel (2001)
separates the traditional Quality of Service (QoS) from two
other parameters, namely Quality of Experience (QoE) and
Quality of Business (QoBiz), which represent, respectively,
the quality of the provider as it is seen from the user, and the
ability of the provider to make profits. The author relates the
various qualities differently in the provider chain, B2C and
B2B scenarios.
Concerning reliability in service compositions, Zo et al.
(2007) present a method to evaluate the reliability of
service compositions. Based on a description of the various
possible structures of service compositions, it evaluates the
combined reliability for each structure. To model service
compositions, Bocciarelli and D’Ambrogio (2011) define a
BPMN extension to model reliability requirements.
3Today, an official definition of reliability is “the ability of a system
or component to perform its required functions under stated conditions
for a specified period of time” (ISO 2010, p. 297).
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Another perspective for the continuity of IT activities
is that of business continuity. Since the interruption of
IT infrastructures can seriously disrupt a business, IT
continuity is essential to achieve business continuity and
should be a part of an effective Business Continuity
Management (BCM) (Wan 2009), which in turn is a goal
that has been deeply targeted by several international
standards, such as BS25999, now superseded by ISO 22301
(ISO 2012).
A framework known as Information Technology Infras-
tructure Library (ITIL) is a set of best practices for man-
aging IT services, developed over the last decades, that has
inspired a number of the more recent international stan-
dards. A significant component of ITIL is Information Tech-
nology Service Continuity Management (ITSCM) which,
in the key area of service delivery, expressly addresses the
need of avoiding outages and failures of IT infrastructures.
ITSCM represents the IT equivalent of BCM (Fry 2004). To
ensure IT continuity, an enterprize must first perform a risk
assessment from an IT perspective, identifying the various
potential threats and their estimated disruptive effects on the
business. Several models exist to perform this assessment
(Guo et al. 2012). On the basis of such an analysis, it is pos-
sible to define a continuity strategy, which should be both
proactive, to avoid incidents as much as possible, and reac-
tive, to mitigate the consequences of unavoided incidents
(Roa Martı´nez 2011).
Other frameworks exist (Salle´ 2004; Na˘stase et al. 2009),
such as the ISACA Control Objectives for Information
and related Technology (COBIT).4 Since it is focused on
objectives rather than procedures, it is not seen as an
alternative to ITIL, but the two frameworks are compatible
(Na˘stase et al. 2009), and the objectives of COBIT can
be mapped onto the corresponding ITIL activities (Kozina
2009). One of the COBIT objectives is to ensure continuous
service (Sahibudin et al. 2008). Some of the standards in
the ISO 27000 series (ISO 2013), also cover the topic of
IT continuity, but mostly in the perspective of information
security.
However, long-term viability corresponds neither to
reliability nor to IT continuity in business. Compared
to reliability, viability is different in causes and effects.
Reliability issues generally stem from faults in the technical
infrastructure, and therefore the topic is more related to
short-term problems, in the perspective of making a service
continuously available, without interruptions or outages
(Lyu 1996). Long-term viability, on the other hand, mostly
concerns business or financial problems, and viability
problems imply the complete cessation of the service (Mills
4http://www.isaca.org/cobit/pages/default.aspx.
2009; Kandukuri et al. 2009; Khajeh-Hosseini et al. 2010).
The approaches for short-term failures are not suited for
addressing the final termination of the CSP, and similarly,
the approaches to achieve long-term viability might be unfit
to solve a few hours’ downtime.
Similarly, the attention on IT continuity is generally
focused on temporary outages, data losses or natural
incidents. IT continuity approaches mostly aim at a
continuity of business, so they are not applicable to a CSP
that undergoes a complete cessation of its activities. To
some extent, they might be applicable to the cloud customer,
because from its point of view the cessation of the CSP
can be partly assimilated to a disaster, requiring a disaster
recovery plan. Previous research has made some steps in
applying IT continuity approaches in case of changes to
the IT infrastructure (Sauve´ et al. 2008) or cloud migration
(Aubert et al. 2002), in particular designing risk analysis
models.
The main reference to the problem of CSP long-term
viability resides in a popular Gartner analysis (Brodkin
2008) which highlights seven critical features that a business
should evaluate when moving to cloud; among these is
long-term viability. The report is considered a milestone
concerning cloud risks. A different risk classification is
provided in Van Hoboken et al. (2013), highlighting the
problem of stored data in the event of bankruptcy.
Other works (Kauffman et al. 2014) include the vendor’s
financial stability in a survey of the potential factors that
need to be taken into account before migrating to a CSP.
Also Mills (2009) considers the various risks associated
with the migration from an insourced infrastructure to a
CSP, and the set of risks includes long-term viability, in the
perspective of contractual issues that have to be addressed,
but does not provide a significant insight into the subject.
A slightly more detailed analysis is offered by Bowen
(2011). This work introduces the distinction among several
scenarios in which the CSP undergoes a soft shutdown (i.e.,
filing for bankruptcy), merges or is acquired, and abruptly
ceases its business. Apart from a brief overview on software
escrows (described in “Mixed approaches”), the book does
not explore other solutions.
Perhaps the only work which concretely attempts to
address the issue of a CSP going bankrupt or ceasing its
business is (Louwers 2013). However, this work exclusively
focuses on legal solutions, without discussing their technical
implications. Moreover, it puts too much emphasis on
the source code of services, essentially addressing SaaS
environments only. Some of these solutions will be
discussed in this paper.
The main works dealing with viability or topics close to
it are summarized in Table 1, along with the main issues that
differentiate them from the present work.
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Table 1 Overview of related work
Source Focus Differences from this work
Lyu (1996) Reliability, short-term failures Causes and consequences are
different for a final shutdown
Sauve´ et al. (2008) IT continuity in infrastructure change Not specifically designed for bankruptcy
or a final shutdown
Aubert et al. (2002) IT continuity in cloud migration
Brodkin (2008), Van Hoboken et al. (2013), Problem statement and classification No solutions proposed
Kauffman et al. (2014), Mills (2009)
Bowen (2011) Problem statement Just a slight consideration on software escrows
Louwers (2013) Viability Legal solutions only, mostly SaaS
Amathematical model of viability
The problem of long-term viability is intuitively obvious,
meaning that the intrinsic risks in outsourcing assets
exposes the outsourcer not only to its own business risks,
but also to those of the CSP. However, viability lacks a
formalization in a mathematical perspective, metrics that
can be used to some extent to measure the viability of a CSP.
Long-term viability can become a safety-critical dimen-
sion for the assets of a business. As such, it could eventu-
ally be included in the scope of established methodologies
and standards for risk assessment, such as the ISO 27000
series of standards5 to assess information security matters
(in a very broad meaning of the term). A mathematical
model captures the main parameters that play a role in the
measured dimension. It thus translates the intuition into a
number. On the basis of such metrics, viability could be
approximated in terms of the probability of encountering
business continuity issues due to the CSP going bankrupt.
A model that represents viability in terms of a probability
(therefore on a scale from 0 to 1) is also easy to integrate
with metrics representing other types of risk.
An analysis of long-term viability would also be useful
for the purposes of selecting a CSP over another. In
other words, metrics could serve as a parameter for cloud
brokering (Liu et al. 2011; Pettey and van der Meulen 2009).
Due to the lack of a model and metrics to express long-
term viability, we introduce a basic model which can be used
to assess the impact of the various risk mitigators presented
in “Addressing the problem”. It is a simple model, based
on a number of approximations, and could be subject to
refinements in the future.
As a quick reference for the formulas introduced in
the present section, Fig. 1 displays a possible visual
description of the model, in a popular notation used to
model the relations between non-functional requirements
(NFRs) (Chung et al. 2000). The diagram shows the
5http://www.27000.org/.
relationships between the various goals (the clouds)
that contribute to determine the viability of the CSP.
The relationships representing the contribution between
goals are either alternative (OR relation, represented by
the connections with double bars) or aggregated (AND
relationships, connections with single bars). The octagonal
nodes represent the problems that can contribute negatively
to the goals. Elements shown as bold clouds or circle
in the model are operationalizations, meaning that the
goal or problem they denote is based on technical,
implementable features. Figure 1 also shows which
variables introduced in the rest of this section affect the
goals and operationalizations in the NFR model.
Fig. 1 Visual representation of the NFR model for viability
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The viability of a CSP can be seen under two
perspectives:
1. the CSP won’t go bankrupt (or other similar disruptive
event);
2. the CSP will go bankrupt, and its customer will be able
to recover business continuity.
The viability of a system corresponds to the probability
that the customer of a CSP can maintain business continuity
regardless of the financial difficulties of the CSP. If pb is
the probability that the provider goes bankrupt, its viability
V can be defined as follows:
V = (1 − pb) + pbα = 1 + (α − 1)pb (1)
where
0  α  1. (2)
To better explain Eq. 1, the probability for a CSP
customer to run correctly partly depends on the CSP not
ceasing business (a situation with a probability of 1 − pb);
in this case, no business continuity problems will befall
its customers. In the opposite event that the CSP does
indeed fail (with probability pb), continuity problems might
or might not occur, depending on a parameter α, which
measures the ease of recovery of the assets and migration to
in-house hosting or to a different CSP.
pb is a complex business index. Previous research (Scott
1981; Dichev 1998; Hillegeist et al. 2002) has defined
several mathematical models for measuring the probability
that a business goes bankrupt, and developing on that topic
is out of the scope of the present research.
The problem, at this point, is assessing α, which enters
into consideration only when the provider ceases business or
files for bankruptcy. In this case, the safest situation occurs
when the following conditions apply:
1. the assets (applications and/or data, depending on how
much has been outsourced) can be recovered promptly
(this corresponds to the “Asset recoverability” goal in
Fig. 1);
2. an alternative host is promptly available (related to
the “Asset relocability” goal in Fig. 1), either in-house
(“Insourceability” and “Possibility to rebuild systems”
goals) or another CSP (“Alternative CSPs” goal);
3. the assets do not need any elaboration to be migrated
(also related to the “Asset relocability” goal in Fig. 1).
If all conditions are met, then α = 1 and V = 1. In other
words, if a CSP goes out of business, its customers won’t
have any problems because they can recover their assets
promptly and migrate them to an alternative CSP without
the need to convert or rewrite anything.
The three directions under which the CSP must be
assessed, then, are the following:
1. the amount of recoverable assets r;
2. its fungibility (interchangeability with other CSPs)
pf , representing the probability of finding a suitable
alternative, i.e., a CSP that offers a similar service, or
can however allow the customer to perform the same
operations;
3. the degree of simplicity of the CSP (whether it uses an
easily manageable Application Programming Interface
(API) or a complex proprietary structure) σ .
The importance of these three factors is not the same. The
first one is way more relevant than the others: if the cloud
customer can’t recover the assets, its previous business is
lost. Also, pf has a greater importance than σ , since if no
alternative infrastructure exists then a new one will need
to be built, and the adoption of standards by the bankrupt
CSP will provide marginal benefits. On the other hand, if
an alternative CSP is available, a simple and standardized
structure for the bankrupt CSP will allow a faster migration
of the assets.
The amount of recoverable assets r is a variable whose
value changes from one customer to another. It can be
expressed as a number ranging from 0 to 1. The higher it
is, the more assets the customer is able to recover, with
0 being a total loss and 1 being a total recovery. r will
depend on the actual size of the outsourced assets SA. As
an approximation, let it be assumed that the asset recovery
follows a linear function, with ρ expressing the recovery
rate, SA the size of the assets, t0 the setup time, before
which no recovery can occur, and tM the maximum available
time, after which the CSP will shut down, preventing any
further recovery. Both t0 and ρ depend on the degree of
standardization adopted by the CSP, so using common and
easily-manageable APIs will reduce the initial slack and
increase the rate at which the assets can be recovered.
Given unlimited time, the time required to recover all the
assets would be
tS = t0 + SA
ρ
. (3)
The recovery function (which is normalized) would be
r(t) =
{
0, if t  t0,
ρ
SA
(min(t, tS) − t0), if t > t0 (4)
which, substituting tS , becomes
r(t) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0, if t  t0,
ρ
SA
min(t − t0, tS − t0) =
= min
(
ρ
SA
(t − t0), 1
)
, if t > t0,
(5)
and consequently the amount of recoverable assets is
r = r(tM) =
{
0, if tM  t0,
min
(
ρ
SA
(tM − t0), 1
)
, if tM > t0.
(6)
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Assessing pf is more complicated. In general, it will
be possible to migrate a service from one CSP to another,
unless very specific and targeted requirements are involved.
However, the customer might have restrictions based on
cost, accountability, security, and so on. The availability
of alternative CSPs will mostly depend on the type and
complexity of the service, on the size of the market sector,
and the business requirements of the customer (for example,
a CSP offering a similar service might charge more than
the customer can afford). A very common service which is
needed by many different business (e.g., a service offering
remote storage or geographical maps) will have pf  1,
whereas a very sectorial service might have pf  0. The
models introduced in existing research on cloud ranking
(Kumar Garg et al. 2013) and brokering (Buyya et al. 2009;
Tordssona et al. 2012) can be used to assess this parameter.
Finally, σ determines the ease of having the services up
and running again on the new CSP, provided there is one
available. Regardless of how this property is measured, in
this model σ is assumed to be normalized, therefore defined
in the range 0  σ  1. This variable is hard to assess,
depending strongly on the structure and complexity of the
service and on the use of standard APIs and protocols. A
very simple service might be migrated easily (σ  1)
even if it uses proprietary formats and protocols, whereas a
complex service will have a high σ only if the APIs have a
clear organization that follows common patterns. Also, the
degree of outsourcing will strongly impact this parameter:
it will be easier to migrate a SaaS service than a IaaS
infrastructure. In general, this parameter can be expressed as
a function σ(Tc, Ss, A), where Tc denotes the type of cloud
(SaaS, PaaS or IaaS), Ss represents the size and complexity
of the outsourced service structure (from 0 for small and
simple services, to arbitrarily large for complex ones), and
A qualitatively denotes the degree of standardization of the
cloud APIs. Tc cannot be considered as part of Ss , although
the type of cloud will clearly impact on the size of the
outsourced assets, because it also affects the infrastructural
requirements and how the APIs are made. It should be noted
that, once the assets have been recovered and a suitable
alternative CSP found, the migration is a matter of time, so
σ gives an indication of the time needed to set up the new
CSP with the recovered assets.
In case an alternative CSP is not found, there is the need
to develop a new infrastructure as well. In this case, the
σ parameter will still be relevant because there will be the
need for migration, but the company must also account for
the effort to develop the new infrastructure, which will again
depend on the type of cloud that was previously being used
Tc and the size of the service structure Ss . Therefore the
ease to set up the services will be σ ′ = σ tB
tB+tD , where
tB denotes the time needed to stage the assets onto the
new infrastructure, and tD the time needed to develop said
infrastructure. For the sake of simplicity, tD is considered
a fixed value given the type of cloud and service, although
clearly it will depend on the development capabilities of
the customer. Several techniques exist for estimating the
development time of a software, some of which are surveyed
in Boehm et al. (2000).
The efficiency of the reaction to the CSP going out of
business can then be expressed as
α = rpf σ + r(1 − pf )σ tB
tB + tD = rσ
tB + pf tD
tB + tD . (7)
The parameters can be increased in many ways. For
example, the availability of an internal backup will extend
tM indefinitely and set a very high ρ, at least for those
assets that have been backed up. An insurance to cover
management expenses of the CSP can increase tM , while
using standard formats can increase ρ and reduce t0. A cloud
or mirroring escrow would set the probability of having
alternative services pf = 1, because it would guarantee that
there is at least another service identical to the one that has
become unavailable.
Some of these values depend on the customer, such as
the size of the outsourced assets and the service structure
or the type of cloud (degree of outsourcing). Others, in
particular the size of the market sector and the availability
of alternative CSPs, as well as the time to develop an
infrastructure, are objective parameters on which neither
the customer nor the CSP can have any influence. The
rest are based on choices of the CSP, and can be used as
brokering factors. Table 2 summarizes the parameters and
which stakeholder they rest upon. Bold entries are those
that whose impact can be assessed only in a qualitative
perspective rather than measured.
In short, the actual viability of the CSP, i.e., the
minimization of the effects of its financial problems on
the business of its customers, is a function depending on
several parameters, which are summed up in the following
expression:
V = f (pb, ρ, tM, t0, A), (8)
with V growing with all the parameters except t0, which
should be as low as possible.
Addressing the problem
This section analyzes the different methods and approaches
that can be used to anticipate the needs for building
trustworthy cloud platforms. The mitigators that can be used
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Table 2 Summary of relevant parameters
Parameter Meaning Depends on Type Range
pb Probability of bankruptcy CSP Probability [0, 1]
ρ Assets recovery rate CSP Bytes/day (0,+∞)
SA Size of outsourced assets Customer Bytes (0,+∞)
tM Maximum time before shutdown CSP Days (0,+∞)
t0 Asset recovery initial onset CSP Days (0,+∞)
pf Availability of alternative CSPs No one Probability [0, 1]
Tc Type of cloud Customer Qualitative {SaaS, PaaS, IaaS}
SS Size of the service structure Customer Bytes (0,+∞)
A Degree of standardization CSP Qualitative
tB Asset staging time No one Days (0,+∞)
tD Infrastructure development time No one Days (0,+∞)
to tackle the problem of long-term viability can be classified
under two different perspectives:
– by actor: depending on who can enact each mitigator,
whether the CSP, the customer, or the two together;
– by nature: some mitigators are based on technical
instruments, some on legal instruments, some on a
combination of the two.
In what follows, these approaches are presented accord-
ing to the classification by nature, taking into account an
information technology perspective, a purely legal perspec-
tive, and finally an approach that combines both the IT and
law perspectives. Some of the solutions analyzed in the fol-
lowing sections were selected on the basis of widespread
business practices (e.g., backup or insurance), including
some used by CSPs in Luxembourg (of which an example is
given in “Considerations on the proposed solutions”. Others
are consolidated technical approaches, often implemented
by existing software tools (e.g., Service Level Agreement
(SLA)). Finally, others are based on a research survey, even
though their interest is more theoretical than practical (e.g.,
shared rights over the assets). For each of the mitigators in
this section, its effect on the viability parameters introduced
in “A mathematical model of viability” is described.
Discussion of possible IT solutions
The risk of a CSP failure can be mitigated by means of
some preemptive technical solutions that cannot prevent
the CSP from ceasing its activity, but can help avoid the
consequences of such an event, especially that of preventing
the cloud customer to carry on its business. Although
approaches based on redundancy and standardization will
involve some additional costs, they might offer a viable
trade-off between expenses and benefits.
Backing up
As obvious as it may seem, the most immediate solution
to protect against the sudden disappearance of a CSP is to
regularly back up one’s software and data. By means of an
in-house duplication of all the assets that are outsourced to
the cloud, an enterprize combines the advantages of both
solutions: on one side, it does not require to maintain the
high-performance, 24/7-reliable infrastructures to deliver its
service to its customers; on the other side, it constantly has
an up-to-date version of its assets, ready for migration to
another CSP (or for insourcing).
Data backup is also advisable if the service delivery is
in-house. In particular, it has been suggested (McKendrick
2013) to use a cloud backup when delivering in-house, and
to use an in-house backup when the services and data are
outsourced.
According to reliability theory (Gnedenko et al. 1969),
redundancy can take several shapes:
– hot standby, where the backup system is running and
constantly up to date with the primary one. Applied to
cloud computing, this means a complete redundancy of
the systems, i.e., every asset belonging to the customer
(only data in a SaaS model; data and source code of
the services in a PaaS model; data, source code and
infrastructure in IaaS) is constantly replicated;
– cold standby, where the backup system exists but needs
to be set up, and the data between the two systems
are aligned only occasionally. In cloud computing, this
would mean that the enterprize has a copy of the
applications and data that have been outsourced to the
CSP, but since they are not running and maintained,
both the applications and the data might be seriously out
of date;
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– warm standby, an intermediate model where data are
aligned periodically, so that the secondary system is not
up to date but it does not need to be set up from scratch.
In cloud computing, this means that at certain intervals
in time the cloud customer performs a fresh backup of
the outsourced assets, which will almost never be up
to date with the CSP, but nonetheless still reasonably
recent.
When dealing with cloud computing, a hot standby in-
house backup is unlikely, because it would imply that the
services are run internally an not only on the CSP, and
this is in contrast with the very logic behind the cloud
paradigm. Despite that, the application of such a solution
would eliminate all viability risks, as the sudden cessation
of business by the CSP would not cause the customer to lose
any data or to be unable to deliver its services, but merely
reduce or lose its redundancy.
Conversely, a hot standby external backup means that the
same service runs concurrently on two different CSPs, and
the backup one is ready to take over in case the one being
delivered fails. This situation corresponds to mirroring
solutions, which are described in “Mixed approaches”. The
rest of this section therefore deals with the cold or warm
standby models, where the assets are replicated but not
aligned with the CSP.
On the down side, backing up the software and the data
has its costs, but these will reasonably be smaller than
those required for in-house operation. Also, this approach
does not solve every problem, because the CSP might use
technologies, protocols and APIs that are not compatible
with an in-house operation, or for migration to a different
CSP. So, backed-up data might still require a lot of work
to restore full business operations. That is, unless the CSPs
are based on some standard technology or structure (as
described in the next paragraph).
Backups can be performed directly by the customer
without the assistance of the CSP. Backups of outsourced
services can be either in-house or external (to a different
CSP). The effect on the mathematical model introduced in
“A mathematical model of viability” is different.
An internal backup reduces SA. If all the assets were
backed up and aligned with those on the CSP (such as in a
hot standby or right after a replication in a warm standby),
then SA = 0, t0 = 0, and tS = 0. However, it does not affect
any of the other parameters.
An external backup won’t affect SA, because the data
will still need to be recovered from the backup. However, it
can still significantly reduce t0 (because the customer needs
only access the backup service) and increase ρ (assuming
that access to the backup is simple). It also increases tM
indefinitely, because the availability of the backed-up assets
does not have any correlation with the bankruptcy of the
other CSP.
The main drawback with backups is that they need to
be updated. However, this problem can be easily overcome
using differential backups. Also, recovering the assets is not
enough to guarantee business continuity.
Cloud platforms portability and standardization
In the last years, several PaaS platforms have appeared
as an initiative to create and manage scalable cloud-based
software. When a PaaS provider goes out of business, cloud
customers should be able to migrate their application to
others sites.
A cloud platform should provide standard connectors,
so that applications can be moved to another platform
adopting the same standards. In the last few years,
several PaaS tools have been proposed by different
PaaS market players. Some of these tools are based on
standard programming languages, however they still suffer
from the lack of standard APIs in terms of interfaces
and applications connectors, thus exposing customers to
vendor lock-in risks. With the lack of interoperability
between platforms, customers’ workload migration from
one cloud provider to a new one becomes a tedious task,
since the customer has to adapt its migrated applications
to the proprietary components of the new provider’s
platform in order to migrate the software and the data.
To ensure high interoperability and portability between
PaaS, standardization initiatives have to be developed to
provide standard application dependencies mechanisms and
common interfaces to ease the transfer of applications
between heterogeneous PaaS platforms. Previous research
(Gebregiorgis and Altmann 2015) provides an assessment
of the cost benefits of a high degree of interoperability.
Interoperability measures (Kuyoro et al. 2011) and
federated clouds (Rochwerger et al. 2009) are potential
mitigators to avoid “vendor locking”, as they could ease
the transition to a new cloud in case the client enterprize’s
chosen CSP goes out of business. With federated clouds,
two or more CSPs share an agreement according to which
the underloaded clouds offer resources to overloaded ones.
Standards normally have a body devoted to their
specification and development. While the adoption of some
standard tools and interoperability measures (e.g., the XML
language as a file format) does not have any formal
requirements, there are many standards that, due to their
complexity, need auditing and certification by the issuing
organization or by a specifically-endorsed enterprize or
institution. Although auditing can entail high costs on the
CSP, the certification by an authoritative source can increase
the customer’s trust (Klass 2006; Kaufman 2009).
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Unfortunately, there are no such things as standard cloud
implementations. Despite some de facto general rules for
building a CSP, and some efforts at defining a standard
(C-SIG SLA 2014), the results so far are still limited.
However, it is still possible to use some interoperability tool
to migrate the assets from one CSP to another. It is also
possible to singularly adopt standard protocols and formats
for the various components of the CSP, which does not
achieve total interoperability but still provides some degree
of facilitation.
A recent initiative to enact interoperability between plat-
forms and to ease the migration of applications is illustrated
by the containers model, whose basic idea is to have an iso-
lated packaging of an application embedded with its depen-
dencies. Using this approach, it becomes easier to move the
overall application when its hosting environment encoun-
ters some problems. “Containerization” (Kharb 2016) has
been promoted by Linux Dockers,6 which adds an addi-
tional layer of abstraction to virtual machines, allowing to
have isolated features within the same Linux instance.
Some authors (Machado et al. 2009) have presented
some proposed standard interfaces such as the Distributed
Management Task Force (DMTF)’s Open Cloud Standards
Incubator (OCSI) for resources management, the Open
Cloud Computing Interface Working Group (OCCI-WG)
for IaaS specification, and Cloud Data Management Inter-
face (CDMI) for the manipulation of data elements. Others
(Harsh et al. 2012) have discussed some standardization
challenges related to credentials and network. Another ini-
tiative to achieve cloud interoperability has been presented
in the Levels of Information Systems Interoperability (LISI)
Maturity Model (Dowell et al. 2011) published by the
Department of Defense (DoD). LISI explores four levels of
system interoperability related to procedures, applications,
infrastructure, and data.
The various approaches related to cloud standardization
mentioned in this section are briefly summarized in Table 3.
By defining standards for the alignment of cloud
development tools and platforms, the migration from one
cloud to another becomes more flexible. Standardization
can have a huge impact on the costs of migration, both
in money and in time, when services and data need to be
transferred from one cloud provider to another one. This is
clearly reflected in the mathematical model for viability.
Implementing the services according to standards facili-
tates recovery of the assets, and in this sense it reduces t0
and increases ρ. It also affects the degree of standardiza-
tion A. Additionally, in case no alternative CSP is available,
insourcing the development of the services will be easier,
thus lowering tD .
6https://www.docker.com/.
Table 3 Cloud standardization approaches
Source Focus
(Kuyoro et al. 2011) Cloud interoperability
(Rochwerger et al. 2009) Federated clouds
(C-SIG SLA 2014) Cloud standard
(Kharb 2016) Containerization
(Machado et al. 2009) Standard interfaces
(Harsh et al. 2012) Credentials and network
(Dowell et al. 2011) Cloud interoperability levels
Service choreographies
Cloud-based services are intricate by design as they are
composed of a number of software services that maintain
several features which depend on different stakeholders. To
maintain these dynamic interactions between stakeholders,
an abstraction layer that models the different flows of
communications between cloud-based software entities is
needed.
Choreographies (Peltz 2003) have been widely used
in the context of web services to specify how services
interact with each other. They commonly rely on the
orchestration of every entity that can be involved in this
choreography. An orchestration specifies from a central
view the behavior of collaborating parties and the flow
of message exchanges between the different entities. A
choreography gives more visibility about the interactions
between the different collaborators, since it enables each
collaborator in the choreography to observe all message
exchanges involved in the different interactions, and thus to
have a global view about the system.
Despite being born in the SOA paradigm, choreographies
can be revisited in the cloud context to provide a high-level
view of the interactions between the different stakeholders
involved in maintaining cloud services. Maintaining the
status of the different collaborations between the different
entities involved in the deployment, delivery and usage of a
service eases the tracking of the partners taking part in the
management of cloud-based applications when the provider
goes out of business.
In the context of this paper, choreographies can be seen
under two perspectives. The first is when one of the actors
in a choreography is the CSP that could potentially file
for bankruptcy. In this situation, the choreography has the
same role of a general cloud customer. The second, which is
examined in this section, is when the CSP is designed as a
choreography (and in turn relying on external services). If it
undergoes financial problems, the choreography design can
indirectly mitigate cascading problems to its customers.
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As a choreography is simply a model of the interactions
between services, it does not per se favor the continuity
of business of the service. However, the viability benefits
of using a choreography in a CSP can be found in the
modularity of the model and in the clear expression of
the requirements, especially when used in conjunction with
SLAs (see “Mixed approaches”). For example, in case
of financial difficulties, the choreography manager can
renegotiate the requirements, in order to enlist cheaper
actors and reduce the costs. The modularity of the
choreography might allow a progressive shutdown of the
services, thus keeping available only those that allow the
cloud customers to recover their assets.
Concerning the viability model described in “A mathe-
matical model of viability”, the service choreography can
affect the parameters in several ways. First off, the fact
that actors are generally replaceable reduces the overall
probability of bankruptcy pb, thanks to the possibility
of enlisting actors that have a smaller impact on the
overall costs. In case of a progressive shutdown in bad
financial circumstances, the time before the final shutdown
tM is increased. Finally, the need to have a modular and
replaceable structure would require the use of popular
standards, consequently raising A.
Using a choreography, however, also has some draw-
backs. The complex and distributed operations carried out
in a service structured as a choreography might imply a low
availability of alternative services pf . Worse than that, the
need to coordinate a number of actors, some of which might
become hardly available, could increase the time t0 it takes
before the actual operations to recover the assets can begin.
Legal perspective and solutions
Contractual agreements can help the stakeholders of a cloud
environment avoid the worries of the CSP’s bankruptcy
or cessation of business. If the problem is not addressed
beforehand, the customer might incur into serious trouble,
because ex post remedies can be quite ineffective, as
explained in the following section.
Consequences of a CSP shutdown
Once the customer’s assets fall into the bankrupt estate,
recovering them might prove uncertain, expensive, and long
enough to seriously damage the customer’s business. In
addition, the liability of a CSP for not being able to provide
its service in continuity is rather blurred (whereas provisions
exist concerning liability for IP violations, failure in data
protection, or negligence in security (Weber and Staiger
2014)); to make things worse, CSPs normally operate by
means of non-negotiable contracts that make frequent use of
liability waivers. Customers are not guaranteed in case of a
prolonged inactivity of the CSP which cascades upon them.
When filing for bankruptcy, the management of the
company is transferred from the CEO or board to a trustee,
under the surveillance of a tribunal. Licensors or third-
party providers cannot take action against the bankrupt CSP
without a judicial authorization, so customers have a few
days to react. However, this protection can’t be relied upon
if human intervention is needed, because employees cannot
be guaranteed to provide customer support (Caplan 2010).
This problem would also impact differently depending on
the size of the CSP: the customers of a major provider would
have an easier opportunity to recover their data, than those
of a small enterprize (Anthony 2012).
If the CSP simply ceases its activity without filing for
bankruptcy, the situation can be much more complicated.
The customer will simply have the normal legal remedies
such as filing a suit for a breach of contract, but this
does not aid in recovering the assets, especially when
manual intervention would be required on the CSP’s side.
Contractual remedies are the ordinary situation that occurs
when the customer cannot do anything but file against the
CSP for damages, so in this situation the viability model is
not affected in any way.
It should be noted, however, that a CSP suffering bad
financial conditions might not file for bankruptcy or cease its
business, but rather be acquired or merged by a financially
stronger enterprize. Under these conditions, the customer is
relatively safe, because the acquiring enterprize will inherit
the existing contracts of the CSP, giving the customer time
to renegotiate the terms or migrate to other providers.
Insurance
In the perspective of the customer not losing its assets or its
business continuity in case of the CSP shutting down, the
CSP can play a significant role by relying on insurances, in
several different forms.
An insurance negotiated by the CSP with a third-party
insurance company in favor of the customer can reduce
the customer’s risks, covering the loss of revenues suffered
in case of the CSP’s cessation of business and giving the
customer time to set up the services again. Still, an insurance
would per se not aid the customer in recovering the assets.
Also, a simpler form of private insurance between customer
and CSP (without the insurance company as a third party)
might imply the CSP requesting a few months’ payment
in advance from the customer; this fee would have to be
bound to ensuring the temporary continuation of the service
(including manual operation) even in case of bankruptcy.
This solution, combined with some agreement which would
grant the customer access to its assets, would allow the
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customer to recover the data and prepare for the migration
or insourcing of the services, without any loss of data or
interruption of business continuity.
A CSPs might use part of its revenues to establish a
special guarantee fund, devoted either to cover the damage
from loss of revenues of its customers, or to keep its own
services up and running for several months and give its
customers the opportunity to take appropriate measures. In
this sense, a SaaS-guarantee fund has been suggested (van
de Zande and Jansen 2011), but it can be applied to other
paradigms as well. The fund could also be set up in a
collaboration between several CSPs, but this would have the
drawback that when an individual CSP in the consortium
disappears, the others might feel like they are paying for its
expenses, and this would be an inhibitor against setting up
such a fund. At any rate, the authors acknowledge that no
such fund exists at the moment.
While all these forms of insurance can provide benefits
to the customer (either by covering damages or by ensuring
business continuity), they will all increase the costs of the
CSP. In case of inter-party insurances, the insurance is paid
directly by the customer, while third-party insurances or
guarantee funds would place some costs on the CSP, which
would in turn charge them on the customer in some way.
The availability of an insurance, and its details and costs,
should be the subject of careful evaluation by an enterprize
when selecting a CSP.
Insurance against bankruptcy or cessation of business
may or may not affect the viability model from “A mathe-
matical model of viability” in different ways, depending on
the type and purpose of the insurance:
– third-party insurance, i.e., an insurance between
the CSP and an external insurance company, can be
contracted to guarantee either the liability of the CSP, or
an extended period of operation in case it goes bankrupt.
While the former insurance does not provide any benefit
to the customer in terms of keeping its its business
running (because it only pays the damages caused to the
customer), the latter can have a significant effect on the
time window tM during which a customer can recover
its assets;
– CSP guarantee funds, if they were existent, would
affect the model exactly as a third-party insurance, and
just as much they could be contracted to guarantee
either liability or an extended operational period. The
only difference is that, being based on a collective
agreement between a number of CSPs, the individual
CSP would have less freedom in negotiating the terms
and the limitations for the guarantee;
– inter-party insurance (meaning an up-front payment
by the customer in favor of the CSP to cover a few
months of the CSP’s operation), on the other hand, can
have the sole purpose of extending the operations of
the CSP (there is no point in the customer paying an
insurance to the CSP to pay damages to itself). While
there is no doubt that the effect would be to increase tM ,
in this case there are some doubts as to the effectiveness
of the insurance, because there is a risk that the CSP
uses the extra cash for other purposes.
Policy support
In 2013, the Luxembourgish Parliament tried to address
the problem of a CSP going bankrupt. The Parliament
introduced provisions7 that allow the owners of intangible
non-fungible goods held by a bankrupt to reclaim those data
at their own expenses, provided they are separable from all
other assets. The provision, according to the parliamentary
discussion, was introduced specifically to address the issue
of a CSP going bankrupt, although its application is not
limited to cloud environments.
The Luxembourgish approach is definitely a step toward
addressing the problem of CSP viability. However, it only
allows to recover the assets, but does not help in relocating
to some other CSP or insourcing, unless the services have
been designed with portability in mind. Moreover, it does
not work well with SaaS platforms, because the customer
will not be able to recover the software, which is a shared
platform and not a proprietary asset of the customer.
Such a capability to recover one’s data in case of a CSP
going bankrupt has a significant impact on the viability
model. In particular, it makes the variable tM totally
irrelevant, since the bankrupt estate will provide the means
to recover the assets, independently of the shutdown.
On the other hand, the complex legal procedures in case of
bankruptcy can take some time before the right of the customer
to recover the assets is recognized and the recovery
operations can begin, thus increasing t0, in contrast with the
need for an expedited reenactment of business operations.
Limited rights over the assets
Some imaginative solutions have been suggested in
Louwers (2013). However, those solutions place too much
emphasis on the source code, and appear to address the legal
issues but not the technical implications. A split copyright
between the CSP and the customer consists in transferring
part of software copyrights to the user, whereas a joint
copyright transfers a share of the ownership; in both cases,
the copyright of the whole source code does not fall into
the bankrupt estate. The software code could be assigned
in usufruct to the customer, or IP rights transferred to a
7Luxembourgish Code of commerce, Article 567.
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foundation or association of customers. Notwithstanding
the inefficiency of these ideas, which would hinder the
CSP’s ability to evolve or improve the services, they place
too much emphasis on the source code. They may allow
its partial recovery, but not ensure the continuity of the
services, as the customer might not have the technical
resources to use those assets.
Data ownership, on the other hand, can be detailed in
the contract, so that the customer’s data do not fall into the
bankrupt estate. Again, this does not help if the CSP simply
shuts down the operations, as the customer will not be able
to recover the data even if it has the right to do so. Therefore,
the contract should either guarantee some maintenance even
after the business closure, at least for a short period, or
provide the customer with some means of accessing the data
without the intervention of the CSP personnel.
Despite the practical difficulties that would arise from the
establishment of a split or joint copyright, from a merely theore-
tical perspective such solutions would undoubtedly provide
some benefits in terms of business continuity. Considering
that the customer would have access to the technologies of
the CSP, it would be eased in the recovery of the assets, both
increasing the recovery rate ρ and reducing the initial onset
t0. Secondly, the privileged insight into the CSP’s internal
structure would make it easier to rebuild an architecture
which provides a similar service, thus reducing tD .
However, the economic problems behind a split or joint
copyright probably overcome their benefits, effectively
making them undesirable solutions.
Mixed approaches
Some mitigators of viability problems consist of legal
solutions that can have a direct technical implementation. In
particular, the efficiency of these solutions is that they can be
implemented, and therefore they operate at a technical level,
but their legal nature gives them a binding strength that can
be enforced in a court if they are breached. These solutions
need to be examined taking both perspectives into account.
Service Level Agreements
A Service Level Agreement (SLA) is a means of expressing
the QoS requirements of a service. In its essence, a SLA
is “an agreement between the service provider and its
customers quantifying the Minimum acceptable service
to the customer” (capital not added) (Hiles 2000), or a
contract expressed in a semi-formal language.8 Several SLA
8Other definitions of SLAs exist. According to Wieder et al. (2011),
SLAs are “a common way to formally specify the exact conditions
(both functional and non-functional) under which services are or
should be delivered”.
languages have been defined, e.g. Andrieux et al. (2007),
Ludwig et al. (2003).
SLAs are generally designed to accommodate languages
for expressing requirements, but not all requirements
are fit to be modeled using formal languages. However,
the formal part is well suited for automated processing,
including monitoring the system to detect SLA violations
(Sahai et al. 2002).
Long-term viability would clearly be one requirement that
is not fit for formal specification or monitoring. Nonetheless
it could be addressed in a SLA, for example by addressing
issues such as disaster recovery, data portability and an exit
strategy. In particular, with respect to data portability, the
parties might benefit from clauses specifying:
– the use of some interface which would ease migration to
other providers, to protect the customer in case of data
loss or business failure of the CSP;
– strict conditions and terms under which the customer is
entitled to enact the migration, to avoid damages to the
CSP due to abuse on part of the customer.
Recently, the European Cloud Select Industry Group on
Service Level Agreements (C-SIG SLA)9 has released a
set of guidelines toward a standardization of SLAs. Among
the service level objectives that should be covered by the
SLA, the guidelines suggest including a termination process
(C-SIG SLA 2014), with steps to enable the customer to
retrieve their data. The problem with this clause, however, is
that it might be difficult to apply in a short time in the case
of a sudden bankruptcy of the CSP.
The effect of a SLA on the viability parameters can
be highly variable, depending on the exact content of the
agreement. However, it can be used to guarantee a minimum
forewarning time before the final shutdown, thus increasing
tM ; to ensure the assistance of the CSP in recovering the
data, reducing t0; and also to require the use of certain
technologies and formats, thus increasing the degree of
standardization A.
The drawback is that there is no guarantee that the CSP
will fulfill the terms of the agreement, especially in case
of serious financial problems. In that case, there will be
additional charges on the CSP for breach of contract, but
this does not help business continuity at all.
Software escrows and implementations for CSPs
Software escrows (Pappous 1985) are a part of intellectual
property licenses that define necessary terms to maintain
a product, including software code. A software escrow is
based on a relationship between a licensor and licensee,
9Information about the group can be found at https://ec.europa.eu/digital-
agenda/en/cloud-select-industry-group-service–level-agreements.
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set up through an escrow agent (a trusted third party). The
agent delivers the software to the licensee and manages
it according to an agreement. To ensure continuity of the
service, software management is delegated to the licensee
in case the licensor is not able to guarantee the software
service anymore, due to bankruptcy (Conley and Bryan
1985) or disaster. The licensee will then provide the service
continuity. In the classification provided by this paper, a
software escrow is categorized as a mixed solution because,
in addition to being based on a contractual agreement
between the licensor and the licensee, the latter must have
a technical infrastructure fit for managing the licensor’s
software services.
Software escrow techniques need to be revisited to be
used in cloud-based services. As the hosting of data and/or
software is outsourced, the availability of services is not
guaranteed by securing a traditional escrow (which only
covers source code), but lies in the hands of the CSP, which
is a key entity to ensure continuity of the services.
Software escrow solutions raise issue concerning soft-
ware synchronization and the viability of software escrow
agents, which is one of the major factors that reduces the
assurance of service continuity in a software escrow service.
Additionally, software escrows are mainly able to address a
SaaS services model, whereas solutions for IaaS and PaaS
providers require mirroring the infrastructure. Specifically,
mirroring a service delivered on a PaaS cloud would require
mirroring the libraries, databases, and specific technologies
used by the PaaS cloud, which normally are proprietary
assets of the CSP and not available externally. Addition-
ally, a IaaS cloud also comprises the hardware resources,
delivered by the CSP in the form of virtual machines that
might again use technology not available to customers, thus
making them difficult to replicate.
When escrows are in force, the viability metrics from
“A mathematical model of viability” are highly affected.
In fact, the software assets are readily available to the cus-
tomer, even in case of a shutdown of the CSP. Therefore,
parameters such as ρ (assets recovery rate), SA (outsourced
amount), tM (time available to recover the assets) and t0
(time required to initiate the recovery) are irrelevant. Of
course, this does not affect the availability of alternative
CSPs, nor the fact that the assets must be transferred to
a different CSP or insourced, which still depends on the
degree of standardization and the complexity of the archi-
tecture. Additionally, software escrows would only cover
the assets belonging to the customer, and not the CSP infras-
tructure, making the benefits mainly relevant for SaaS services
and largely ineffective for PaaS and IaaS delivery models.
In recent years, dedicated escrow solutions for cloud-
based software applications offer a mirroring of the
whole application execution environment (van de Zande
and Jansen 2011). To maintain the cloud-based software
available when the provider goes out of service, the
hardware resources, application platform, dependencies
and on-line status execution are continuously mirrored.
Companies like Iron Mountain and EscrowTech have
developed some dedicated services for SaaS systems,
offering business continuity options based on backup sites
mirroring the services and the data.
A mirroring escrow combines the strengths of backup
solutions and software escrows. Like a backup, it maintains
an updated copy of all the assets of the CSP; like a software
escrow, it legally enables the licensee to deliver the service
in case the licensor becomes unable to. This solution is ideal
since it enables to restore the whole provider’s context when
it goes out of business, assuring the continuity of services.
In case of a service failure, the escrow agreement enables
these backup sites to ensure the continuity of services.
However, it is quite expensive for both the cloud customer
and the provider because each service that runs in the cloud
environment must be cloned.
Recently, an escrow alliance has described the essential
building blocks for a cloud escrow solution:10
– the contract that states relevant elements related to
the source code of applications and their underlying
platforms, the SLAs and the users’ context;
– an online deposit as a backup environment to ensure
service availability;
– verification mechanisms to control backup and restora-
tion of processes.
Both cloud providers and users can benefit from software
escrow techniques, but there is still a lot of effort to be done
by cloud stakeholders in the domain of software escrows,
particularly with respect to standard agreements.
Concerning the viability model, mirroring escrows
provide even greater benefits than software escrows, since
they replicate the underlying architecture and the user’s
context. This means that an alternative platform to run
the business is already available, although possibly at
higher costs (the escrow agent would need to employ
more resources to deliver the service than to simply store
a duplicate of the CSP infrastructure and the customer’s
context). In other words, the customer would still need to
find an alternative CSP or insource the infrastructure, but
business continuity is guaranteed, at least in the short term.
Summary
A brief summary of the proposed mitigators is shown in
Table 4, also emphasizing how they fit into the classification
introduced at the beginning of this section.
10http://www.escrowalliance.nl/en/escrow-solutions/cloud-escrow-so
lutions/.
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Table 4 Summary of solutions for long-term viability
Mitigator
Applicable
delivery
models
Actor Nature
Variables Notes Economic impact
CSP Customer Legal Technical
Back-ups All SA , t0 , tS , tM , ρ
Some in-house infrastructure is required,
but less expensive as the one needed to de-
liver the service. Ready duplicate of soft-
ware and data for fast redeployment
Costs depend on assets’ size and are
long-running. Benefits only for re-
covery
Standards and
interoperability
All ρ ,A, tD
Standards can offer a widespread technol-
ogy for the services, thus allowing to mi-
grate to other services that adopt similar
standards
Cost depends on time of standard
adoption, plus auditing costs based
on size. Benefits in for customers in
saving in case of migration
Service
choreographies
All p f , t0
Standard interfaces between services make
it easier to replace an actor in case of a ces-
sation of business. A governing board can
also remove an actor if it doesn’t provide
enough guarantees
Design and governance costs. Ben-
efits in modularity of the service
Legal remedies All
It might be hard to obtain the fulfillment of
the CSP’s obligations and damage restora-
tion once it ceases business, and dam-
age restoration does not help the customer
reenact its business in a short time
No costs on benefits before
bankruptcy. Then costs (legal and
losses due to data and operativ-
ity loss) only on customers. No
benefits
Third-party
insurance
All tM
Should be combined with a
contractual agreement to recover the
customer’s own assets, without the
CSP’s cooperation
Cost increase with the size of the
insured assets and potential
economic consequences, but can
be charged on customers. Benefits
in the potentially integral
compensation of losses
Inter-party
insurance
CSP guarantee
fund
Recovery of own
data
IaaS, partly
PaaS
tM Only applicable in Luxembourg so far
No costs involved. Benefits in a
faster asset recovery
Split or joint
copyright
SaaS ρ , t0 , tD
Problems in splitting copyright over multi-
ple customers and about the ownership of
the data. Only allows the recovery of the
source code which is not the key feature of
modern cloud environments
Costs might scale rapidly if large
technological assets need to be
modified. Limited benefits in court
proceedings, as customers partially
own the assets
Service Level
Agreement
All t0 , tM ,A
A SLA can define both functional and
non-functional requirements, but metrics
are required for enforcement. Such metrics
might help assess the CSP’s financial sta-
bility
May entail costs for violations.
Benefits in the use of standard com-
ponents, and for customers in case
of migration
Software escrow
All ρ , SA , t0 , tM
The agreement with the original CSP
must address the transmission of data
to the escrow
Costs scale rapidly with infrastruc-
ture size. Benefits for customers as
no assets or operativity is lostMirroring escrow
Considerations on the proposed solutions
Given the possible solutions that can help increase the CSP’s
viability, thus offering it more credibility in the eye of
its (potential) customers, the main question that needs to
be answered is what solutions a CSP should adopt, and
(from an opposite perspective) what features an enterprize
should look at when selecting a CSP, to have a guarantee
of long-term viability. Some preliminary considerations,
including a qualitative evaluation of the costs and benefits
involved, will follow, focused specifically on the event of
the CSP ceasing business, but a detailed cost analysis of
the technical and legal solutions is out of the scope of this
paper and will be reserved for a future work. A summary of
these considerations can be found also in the “Notes” and
“Economic impact” columns of Table 4.
Backing up the assets is a measure that resides solely
on the customer, and its costs can increase significantly
with the assets’ size. Additionally, there will be an initial
cost for the backup infrastructure, plus a running cost,
independently of the type of backup (internal or external).
For an internal backup, the initial costs will concern the
acquisition and setup of the storage facilities, and the
running costs will involve their maintenance. For an external
backup, the initial cost will be represented by the initial
transfer of the assets, while the running cost will include
the lease of the storage space (an assessment is provided in
Vrable et al. 2009). Backed-up assets, on the other hand, do
not provide any economic benefit until there is a failure and
the backup needs to be recovered. In that case, a backup will
save economic backfires due to asset loss or to delays in
recovering the assets from a bankrupt CSP, but it still does
not provide any benefit with respect to the need of finding
or setting up a new suitable infrastructure to replace the
bankrupt one.
Interoperability techniques and standards for cloud
portability are easy and cheap improvements if adopted
early on, while they become more complex and expensive
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for the CSP as the business size and the number of customer
grows. In particular, the early-on adoption of a specific
standard is almost inexpensive. As it is unlikely that a
large CSP disappears in a short time, redesigning a non-
interoperable platform to allow easy portability of the
services might be a appealing solution than it would be for
small and medium CSPs. Weitzel et al. (2006) proposes a
cost analysis model for the adoption of standards, although
designed for network protocols. Once a standard is in use,
there might be additional costs for audits for standard
compliance and certification, both internal to the enterprize
and external from certification bodies. These recurring costs
increase with the size of the audits, but this size only
depends on the amount of services offered by the CSP and
its infrastructure, while it is unaffected by the number of
customers and the amount of their outsourced assets. On
the other hand, the benefits of well-designed interoperability
measures can greatly outweigh their costs, as pointed out
by Tassey (2000), for example by allowing to use existing
specifications and tools designed in conformity with the
standard. In case of bankruptcy, assuming that the assets can
be recovered and that suitable alternatives exist, customers
would have an easier time in relocating their assets.
Adopting a service choreography model, which generally
also relies on SLAs, can improve the quality of the single
actor and of the overall service composition. Although
a service choreography consists of a number of actors
providing interconnected services, there is normally a
governing board that manages the choreography as a whole.
The governing board has the power to take decisions
concerning the assignment of the roles, and a proactive
attitude of the board can help anticipate financial problems
of the actors, thus avoiding a cascading effect on the
whole choreography. On the other hand, choreographies
require complex planning, design and governance that can
weigh somewhat on the costs, especially a large plethora
of services are provided. Little literature seems to address
an assessment of their costs and benefits, although some
model to analyze the cost of a choreography role is provided
by Pandey and Chaudhary (2008). In case of bankruptcy of
the CSP, such formal models may provide some benefits in
migrating to available alternatives. Additionally, a carefully-
designed choreography can save significant expenses on the
CSP’s side, allowing to disconnect those roles that provide
non-critical services or renegotiating the roles with cheaper
actors.
From a legal standpoint, an insurance that guarantees
that the services will keep running for some months after
the CSP goes out of business would help medium and
large providers, while for small ones it might have too high
a cost against the benefits it offers. The insurance cost
would be charged back on the customers, and this might
be possible only in an economy of scale. Therefore, the
benefits of insurance are more easily seen in large-scale
CSPs, where otherwise the financial losses of a cessation of
business could be worldwide devastating. Additionally, as
an insurance only provides a financial support but no means
to recover the assets that are stored on the CSP (in particular
in the case of the CSP simply ceasing business), it should be
coupled with some other solution that addresses that need.
The Luxembourgish law on data asset recovery suffers
the limitation of being applicable only Luxembourg-based
CSPs. It does not require any cost on the CSP’s or the
customer’s side, since it is a legal provision. On the
downside, its economic benefits are somewhat limited, as it
simply allows a preferential lane to recover the outsourced
assets that therefore don’t fall into the bankrupt estate. Such
a benefit would be easily outweighed by a backup or an
escrow, which eliminate the need to recover the assets.
SLAs are a practical solution when standardization is
not a viable option (e.g., because non-standard systems
are already in place and a complete redesign would be
too expensive), because they do not involve redesigning
the services but only providing a guaranteed quality of
service and adequate interfaces. They are fit for both
small and large CSPs. To be effectively implemented,
however, a SLA needs to be supported by adequate
software tools and appropriate metrics to measure the
quality requirements. Concerning costs and benefits, these
instruments are similar to standards, although more flexible
in that their requirements may be negotiated and are not
established by an external regulator. However, SLAs are
also legally-binding contracts, and in case of a breach the
non-obliging partner may incur into penalties, even in the
absence of damages. Cost models for SLAs takes into
account the adoption of the SLA (Maurer et al. 2012) and
the penalties in case of violation (Abrahao et al. 2006).
Finally, software escrows and mirroring need adequate
planning to be set up, and in particular they must clearly
define the terms of the transfer of the assets from the
original CSP to the escrow. Such solutions provide huge
benefits to viability, but their cost might be prohibitive.
Small enterprizes might not be able to afford the costs of
maintaining a duplicate of their services and data at an
escrow provider, whereas large CSPs might have such a
technological asset that doubling the resources might be
a non-feasible task. Additional costs stem from the risk
of failure or bankruptcy by the escrow service (Mezrich
2001). In short, escrow services seem to provide a positive
benefit-cost ratio only for medium-sized CSPs.
Summary depending on CSP type and size
On the basis of the above considerations, it would be useful
to sum up the analysis carried out so far, trying to identify
what are the preferable solutions to increase the long-term
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Table 5 Possible solutions depending on size and delivery model
Size
Type
IaaS PaaS SaaS
Small
Backup
Standards
Inter-party insurance
Medium
Backup
Standards
SLA SLA
Choreography Choreography
Third-party insurance
Escrow
Large
Standards
SLA SLA
Choreography Choreography
Third-party insurance
viability of a CSP. The answer to this question depends on
a huge number of factors and cannot be straightforward, but
it is possible to highlight a few general guidelines.
The main variable to take into account is necessarily the
size of the CSP, both in terms of the amount and variety of
services provided, and of the number of customers. Addition-
ally, the delivery model (IaaS, PaaS or SaaS) is relevant.
As shown in Table 5 and better explained supra, the
only mitigator that a CSP is encouraged to adopt in any
situation is to use standard tools and technologies (provided
they are available for the desired purpose) instead of
developing proprietary ones. SLAs and choreographies can
be of little use in a small scale, where the complexity
of the system is limited (both in the size and in the
delivery model), but become more relevant as its size and
complexity grow. Escrows might be an excessive solution
for small businesses, as its cost might outweigh the benefits,
and might entail overwhelming costs for large enterprizes
with huge amounts of assets. Concerning insurance, small
CSPs might benefit from an anticipation of a few months’
worth of pricing by their customers (thus endowing the
CSP with the ability to keep the systems running after the
cessation of business), but such a solution might become
impossible as the infrastructure size (and maintenance
costs) increases, so an insurance against data loss from a
licensed insurance company might be more useful. Finally,
the customer is always encouraged to have a backup of its
assets, independently of the size and type of the CSP that it
uses as an infrastructure.
Best practices in an actual example
The objective of this section is to describe best practices and pos-
sible techniques actually used to ensure cloud providers
viability. Such techniques can be shown through the exam-
ple of a cloud provider located in Luxembourg that hosts a
Web Banking application. A practical representation of the
techniques can be shown with models used in requirements
engineering, and particularly to the Socio-Technical Secu-
rity modeling language (STS-ml) language (Dalpiaz et al.
2011) and the STS-Tool (Paja et al. 2014), derived from
the i* notation (Yu 1997). The requirements model for the
example is displayed in Fig. 2. In particular, the diagram
shows the activities put into place by the Luxembourgish
CSP that have an impact on long-term viability.
In the diagram, the gray boxes represent the documents
(in a very broad sense) produced by each actor toward
the fulfillment of a given goal. “Darker” boxes represent
documents that are produced by externally and transmitted
from one actor to another.
On a regular basis, the CSP performs a backup of all
the assets and services that support the deployment and
the execution of the Web Banking application. To ensure
portability and standardization, it recurs to XML and web
services for the implementation of the application. This
enables the use of standard connectors, and allows to
easily redeploy the application to another environment in
case the cloud provider stops its services. All business
flows that describe the customers’ connection to the Web
Banking application, the financial transactions and services
that can be performed once the end users log into their
web banking session are modeled through choreographies.
A legal framework defines the terms of services between
the bank and the cloud provider. In this legal framework,
objectives and penalties are defined by means of SLAs, and
a termination plan defines the different actions required to
ensure the continuity of services. Additionally, as the CSP is
located in Luxembourg, in case of bankruptcy its customers
can retrieve their assets, according to the Luxembourg law.
The banking application runs through a load-balancing
mode in three sites, two distant sites in two different
centers in Luxembourg and one site in Germany. This load-
balancing mode enables continuous service delivery even
in case of disaster occurring in one of those sites. From
the point of view of the mathematical model described in
“A mathematical model of viability”, it also contributes to
increasing the fungibility pf of the system, because, in
case of bankruptcy of the Luxembourgish CSP, it is more
likely that other companies acquire the assets and enact the
services again, as it would be possible to acquire not the
whole CSP but just one of the sites. The backup of data and
critical services is performed in all three sites.
A certified auditor controls all the services according to
the ISO 27001 standard twice a year. ISO 27001 specifies
an Information Security Management System (ISMS) that
is used to identify potential risks. It focuses on ensuring
confidentiality, integrity and availability of providers
supported services. It also requires an exhaustive listing and
asset management with criticality level classification. This
classification allows to identify and set up the appropriate
measures to increase the amount of recoverable assets r
Cloud providers viability 71
Fig. 2 i* requirements model
defined in the viability model. The auditors also verify
that Business Continuity Plan (BCPs) are identified as
formal procedures in the enterprize, and that BCP tests
are performed regularly to assess the recovery rate and
the setup time required before recovery. The outcome of
such procedures ensures that appropriate actions are taken
following these tests. The impact on the parameters in the
viability model is to improve the recovery rate ρ and the
setup time value t0.
The cloud provider acts as a Professionals of the
Financial Sector (PSF) entity (the wide set of operators who
exercise in a professional financial activity in Luxembourg),
and transmits all reports to the CSSF, which regulates the
financial sector in Luxembourgish institutions, to verify
that the cloud provider is compliant with all the prudential
regulation when providing its services.
What emerges from the scenario presented above is that,
although it is impossible to completely wipe away all risks
for the customer in the case of bankruptcy of the CSP, the
combination of several of the above techniques (including
backup, standard interfaces and connectors, choreographies,
SLAs, and policy support) creates a protective cushion that
can offer guarantees in such a situation. If the guarantees
offered are considered sufficient, the CSP will create a high
degree of trust that will attract customers. It should also be
noted that some of the above measures, such as backing up
the assets and the use of certain standards, is mandatory in
such a delicate domain as finance, but other, less critical
domains would still benefit from a voluntary adoption of
such measures.
Conclusions
This work analyzes the current cloud landscape by focusing
on the challenges related to CSPs’ long-term viability,
which is largely unexplored. One of the main risks
associated with the cloud computing model has been
pointed out, analyzing the current challenges behind the
continuity of services when the provider goes out of
business. It is a minimal risk for big corporations, as they are
generally financially strong and able to withstand financial
difficulties for extended lengths of time; on the other
hand, when outsourcing to a small enterprize, appropriate
measures are needed in case the CSP vanishes from one day
to the next one, because even a short period of bad financial
results might prevent it from continuing its business. The
problem of cloud providers’ long-term viability has no easy
solution, since it is unpredictable if and when a CSP will go
out of business. Unfortunately, it is the object of very little
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investigation, despite the huge consequences that it can have
on modern businesses.
The paper starts out by framing the problem of long-term
viability, using some real-world examples to highlight its
potential impact. Then, the first topic that this work tries to
address is that of classifying viability in relationship with
other requirements, particularly reliability.
Following an approach widely used in requirements
engineering, a model of long-term viability is then
proposed, destructuring it into its basic factors and defining
metrics to measure them according to this partitioning.
Using that model as a reference, the paper then surveys
the most relevant approaches that can be undertaken to
increase the viability of a CSP and mitigate the problems
into which customers can incur in case it actually (and
maybe suddenly) goes out of business. These approaches
can ensure that the service keeps running steadily, albeit
under a different legal entity (software escrow); keep the
services running for some time, to allow the customer to
retrieve its assets (insurances and advance payments); allow
to quickly migrate the outsourced assets (standards and
interoperability measures); or allow recovery of the assets
in a bankruptcy procedure (under Luxembourgish law).
Among these, the first category offers the customer a long-
term guarantee, as the escrow can deliver the service in a
manner which minimizes the inconvenience to customers,
while the approaches in all other categories are more
limited, as customers are required to undertake a prompt
reaction in order not to lose their assets and business
continuity. It should be noted that the approaches described
in the context of this paper were not originally designed to
solve the problem of long-term viability, but they can be
used for this purpose as well.
The choice of a CSP can also be based on the degree of
viability offered (such as specific contractual clauses). For
this reason, the above measures serve not only to protect
the customer against the loss of the means of doing its
business, but also to increase the trust inspired by the
CSP. The present research offers a means of evaluating the
measures adopted by the CSP, and perform a quick analysis
of its long-term viability. The proposed model allows to use
viability as one of the parameters that will drive the choice
of outsourcing assets to the cloud, and in the selection of
which CSP to adopt. With some refinement, it would also
be possible to implement the measures in a cloud-brokering
tool. An implementation of the proposed model using a
formal language to express non-functional requirements,
such as SysML or one of the formalisms used for SLAs,
might allow it to be integrated into existing tools.
The proposed measures differ significantly, both in their
costs and in the benefits they provide. A CSP should find
the right trade-off between a desired degree of long-term
viability and the resources that it should invest toward that
goal. The last result of the current research is an analysis of
the proposed solutions in the perspective of their prospective
costs and benefits. It is not a full-fledged cost analysis, but
at least it provides an estimate of what measures should be
preferred, on the basis of the main features (delivery model
and size) of the CSP.
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